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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

MELODY LEETHAM,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

No. 19250

RICHARD D. LEETHAM,
Defendant-Appellant.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal concerns that portion of the
trial court's Decree of Divorce which grants custody of the parties' minor daughter to the Respondent.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Respondent filed an action for divorce
on or about May 10, 1982.

Following trial of the

matter on April 14, 1983, the Honorable Scott
Daniels awarded respondent the permanent care, custody and control of the parties' two-year-old
daughter.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an Order affirming the trial
court's award of permanent custody to Respondent.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent and Appellant were married to
one another on October 1, 1979.

There was one child

born as issue of the marriage, Kacie Lynn Leetham,
born May 24, 1980.

Respondent had a son, Chris

Worthington, by a former marriage; Chris was about
two and one-half when Kacie was born. (Tr.4)
Respondent filed for divorce from Appellant for the second time in May 1982 and was awarded
temporary custody of Kacie.

(Eval.)

Respondent had

had temporary custody of Kacie for almost one year
at the time of trial on April 14, 1983.
5 and 26)

(Eval., Tr.

Respondent had taken a voluntary lay off

from her job as a laborer at Amax Specialty Metals in
October 1982 to spend more time with her two children
and because she expected to be rehired within ninety
days when business improved. (Eval., Tr. 22-23)

Re-

spondent had been unemployed and at home with her two
children six months at the time of trial. (Tr. 66)
Appellant had been paying Respondent $75.00 per month
as temporary child support for Kacie. (Tr. 5)
Appellant had a history of psychiatric
problems related to drug abuse.

Appellant had been

seeing a psychiatrist while dating Respondent.
pellant was hospitalized on the psychiatric ward
at St. Mark's Hospital when Respondent was preg-

2

Ap-

11nr•r

ti'
L

1-1i l h

1 E.va

1' r' dd Pins

1 .• eernPo

Appellant blamed Respondent for

Kd<' Ii:-

l. )

The evaluator observed that

to hE' an effort for Appellant to keep his

··roi <.:e and emotions under control.

(Eval.)

Appel-

lant testified at trial that he had been involved
with drugs, but not within the past year.

(Tr. 49)

Appellant admitted at trial that he had understated
his monthly income by 50% in the financial declaration
he submitted to the trial court. (Tr. 32-36)

The

testimony Appellant's mother gave regarding Appellant's board, room and incidental expenses varied
from the figures Appellant had claimed in his financial declaration.

(Tr. 52-53)

When Kacie was about six weeks old, Appellant beat Chris for wetting the bed.

Respondent pro-

tested; Appellant struck Respondent; Appellant took
che tiny baby and left.

Respondent reconciled with

Appellant at that time only because she couldn't
~ear

ter.

to be separated from her six-week-old baby daughAppellant continued to threaten he would take

Kacie awav from Respondent.

!Eva!.)

Counsel for the parties stipulated to the
admission of the child custody evaluation performed by
Jo,re Htgash1.

a

hance

Lo

the hearing.

The trial court noted that it had had

read the evaluation quite thoroughly before
!Tr. 651

The evaluator observed in the

1epc•rt that perhaps Respondent was overly alert to her

3

children's behavior.

The evdluator also observed

that Respondent had a close, affectionate relationship with her children and recommended that Respondent be awarded permanent custody of Kacie.

The

evaluator noted that if further psychological evaluation of Respondent appeared warranted, the trial
court could order such evaluation.

The trial court

did not order that Respondent be evaluated further.
Appellant had been employed at Utah Marblehead Lime since September 1977.

Appellant was the

union president at Utah Marblehead Lime and attended
Trade Tech College two times a week. (Eval., Tr. 41)
Appellant intended to continue to reside with his
parents and siblings, although he testified it was a
possibility he might remarry and move out.

(Tr.37)

Appellant's father and mother were employed.

(Eval.,

Tr. 27 and 50)
Respondent testified that the relationship
between Chris and Kacie was very close.

(Tr. 63-65)

Appellant testified that Kacie and Chris "do all right
together" and that he didn't "think it's right that
they be split up unless the circumstances called for."
(Tr. 38 and 40)

Appellant at one point referred to

Chris and Kacie as "our children." (Tr. 45)

Appellant

had not adopted Chris be~ause he felt it was a ploy to
get support payments.

Appellant felt he had been

"initially too hard on Chris" and "hurt his personality"
4

'"';>,ri>Lted that.

"'"'J

(E.:val.l

Apµellanr testified, however, that he felt
i.L

woutd not be in the best interest of Kacie to live

with

1

~hri

s, "because of Melody's background and the

way Melody has turned out, being around that environment

It's not right to have a child around

that kind of environment, in my eyes." (Tr. 48-49)
On cross examination, Appellant then testified to
havi.ng

been

involved with drugs during the time he

lived with Kacie, Melody and Chris as a family.

(Tr.

49)
Appellant called two witnesses to testify
to the "circumstances" and "environment" to which
he generally referred.

Charles Johnson testified

to having seen Respondent in a bar with Kacie.
54-551

(Tr.

Respondent testifed that on one occasion

she had taken Kacie with her to return some milk
bottles to a woman who worked in a bar, rather than
leave Kacie alone in the car.

(Tr. 61, 20-21)

John Chidester, Sr., testified that he
thought a Rex Stromberg spent the night with Respondent, but he "wouldn't go so far as to say he had
moved anything in." ITr. 60)
rhdr

~tromberg

Respondent testified

had not moved in, but sometimes spent

lhe night there.

Respondent testified that her bed-

room was at one end of the mobile home and the chil-

5

dren's bedrooms were at the other end.

Respondent

testified that at no instance did either child observe she and Stromberg in the bedroom. (Tr. 62-63)
Respondent testified that she understood that in
the event the trial court granted her custody, the
overnight behavior was going to have to cease and
desist.

(Tr. 21-22)
The trial court struggled with the custody

issue:
THE COURT: Well, this is not an easy
case on custody, I think.
The question of the best interest of
this child and whether-On the one hand, you have the very important relationship between the little girl
and her brother--which I think is very important and shouldn't be--the two shouldn't
be separated, except for very compelling
reasons.
On the other hand, I don't think it's
really going to do any good to enter some
kind of an order that the plaintiff not
take the child into bars or not have her
boyfriend stay over, things like that.
I think it;s evident that if she wants to
do those things, she's going to do them.
If she's not going to refrain from doing
them while the custody hearing is pending,
certainly she's not going to afterwards.
And it's evident that the court order is not
going to keep her from doing those things.
The question is: Which is really the
most important and how do you weigh that.
I'm not so sure I know the answer to it. (Tr. 75-761
The trial court found it in the best interests
of the child, Kacie Lynn Leetham, to award custody
to Respondent, subject to the reasonable visitation
rights of the Appellant. ITr. 761

The trial court

admonished Respondent regarding her conduct:

6

THE COURT: I want her to know that-although I'm not entering a specific order
about that--that in the event that that kind
of behavior is evident, that will be taken
into consideration by the court at any sub:::equent petition for a modification, that
the plaintiff can--or the defendant can
petition for a modification in the decree if
it appears that the child's best interests
are not being served and if the environment in which she's being raised is not appropriate.
I think she probably understands that
and I'm sure her attorney will advise her
of that. That doesn't need to be part of
the order but goes without saying. (Tr. 79)
Respondent has had custody of Kacie from
that time forward.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: WHERE THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT A FINDING
THAT RESPONDENT'S HETEROSEXUAL RELATIONS
WITHOUT MARRIAGE HAD AN ADVERSE EFFECT UPON
THE PARTIES' TWO-YEAR-OLD DAUGHTER, THE TRIAL
COURT PROPERLY AWARDED RESPONDENT PERMANENT
CUSTODY OF THE CHILD.
§30-3-10, U.C.A. 1953, as amended 1977, reads:
In any case of separation of husband
and wife having minor children, or wherever
a marriage is declared void or dissolved
the court shall make such order for the
future care and custoay of the minor children as it may deem just and proper. In
determining custody, the court shall consider
rhe best interests of the child and the past
conduct and demonstrated moral standards of
each of the parties.
In Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, Utah, 599 P.Zd 510
11979), Chief Justice Hall noted:

" . . . the trial court is given particularly
broad discretion in the area of child custody
inc~aent to separation or divorce proceedings.
: Footnote omitted.) A determination of the
"best interests of the child" frequently turns

7

on numerous factors which the trial court is
best suited to assess, given its proximity to
the parties and the circumstances. Only where
the trial court action is so flagrantly unjust as to constitute an abuse of discretion
should the appellate forum interpose its own
discretion." 599 P.2d at 511-512.
In Jorgensen, this Court found no abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial court.
Similarly, in Mitchell v. Mitchell, 668
P.2d

561

(1983), Justice Durham, writing for the

Court, found no abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court faced with an extremely difficult
decision regarding custody:
. . The trial court was in an advantaged
position in dealing with the witnesses and
the parties and, "(o)nly where (the) trial
court('s) action is so flagrantly unjust as
to constitute an abuse of discretion should
the appellate forum interpose its own judgment." Jorfensen v. Jorgensen, Utah 599
P.2d 510, 5 2 (1979) See also, ~, Nilson
v. Nilson, Utah 652 P.2d 1323 (llffi2). -sUCll"
is not the case here."
In Hutchison v. Hutchison, Utah 649 P.2d
38 (1982), Justice Oaks, writing for a unanimous
Court, listed some of the numerous factors which
the trial court is best suited to assess.
"Some factors the court may consider
in determining the child's best interests
relate primarily to the child's feelings
or special needs:
the preference of the
child; keeping siblings together; the relative strength of the child's bond with one
or both of the prospective custodians; and,
in appropriate cases, the general interest
in continuing previously determined custody

8

arrangements where the child is happy and
well adjusted.
Other factors relate primarl ly to the prospective custodians' character or status or to their capacity or willingness to function as parents: moral
character and emotional stability; duration
and depth of desire for custody; ability to
provide personal rather than surrogate care;
significant impairment of ability to function as a parent through drug abuse, excessive drinking, or other cause; reasons for
having relinquished custody in the past;
religious compatibility with the child; kinship, including, in extraordinary circumstances, stepparent status; and financial
condition.
(These factors are not necessarily
listed in order of importance.)" 649 P.2d
at 41.
Justice Oaks repeated this Court's deference to the
trial court's unique opportunity to observe the
parties and their witnesses:
"Assessments of the applicability and
relative weight of the various factors in
a particular case lie within the discretion
of the trial court.
'Only where trial court
action is so flagrantly unjust as to constitllte an abuse of discretion should the appellate forum interpose its own judgment.'
Jorgensen v. JorRensen, Utah, 599 P.2d

510, 512 (1979).

Ibid.

In Lembach v. Cox, Utah, 639 P.2d 197
11981\, Justice Howe reiterated the Court's recog-

nit ion in Jorgensen, supra, of" 'the continued vitality
of a judicial preference for the mother in child
custody matters, all other things being equal' even
though the statutory maternal presumption formerly
contained in §30-3-10 was repealed in 1977." 639
l'.2d at 200.

Similarly, in Boals v. Boals, Utah, 664

9

P.2d 1191 (1983), Chief Justice Hall recognized the
prerogative of the trial judge to weigh "the best
interests of the child, mindful of the usually
unique role played by a mother in caring for a
child of tender years.

Cox v. Cox, Utah, 532 P.2d

994 (1975l; Steiger v. Steiger, Utah, 4 U.2d 273,
293 P.2d 418 (1956)."
The very important relationship between
the children in a divorced family received special
comment by Chief Justice Crockett in Jorgensen,
supra.
"One of the principal factors to be
given consideration is that there may be,
and in most instances there are, greater
values to be found in the children being
together, and in their relationships with
each other, that are to be found in their
relationships with their divorced and contentious parents,
"
599 P.2d at 512.
Numerous courts have considered the matter
of custody where the custodial parent's heterosexual relations without marriage were continuing,
or apparently continuing, at the date of a custody
modification determination.

100 A.L.R.3d 625, Modi-

fication of Child Custody Order.

The cases cited

in the article clearly establish a modern trend,
applicable to initial custody determinations as well,
toward consideration of whether a meretricious relationship has a detrimental effect upon the child(renl.
:!"n ol_<ier cases

mere evidence of a mother's

10

moral

transgression was sufficient to deprive her

uf custody . .Wilbanks v. Wilbanks (1965) 220 Ga.
665, 141 SE2d 161; Harris v. Garmon (1971) 228 Ga.
413, 185 SE2d 802; Simpson v. Simpson (1974) 233
Ga. 17, 209 SE2d 611; Otani v. Otani (1927) 29 Hawaii
866; Vice v. Vice (1939) 192 La. 1002, 190 So. 111;
Kleinpeter v. Kleinpeter (1935) 182 La. 198, 161
So. 582; Tulley v. Tulley (1931, Mo.App.) 38S.w.2d291; J. v.'
(1969, Mo. App.) 446 SW2d 425; Carey v. Carey (1925)
4 NJMisc. 1, 131 A. 103; Costello v. Costello (1970)
185 Neb. 396, 176 NW2d 10; Brim v. Brim (1975, Okla.
App.) 532

P2d 1403; Sullivan v. Sullivan (1963)

236 Or. 192, 387

P2d 571; Eaton v. Eaton (1961, Pa. l

3 Adams Co. Leg. J. 67; Bliffert v. Bliffert (1961)
14 Wis.2d 316, 111 NW2d 188; Bell v. Bell (1980)
154 Ga.App. 290, 267 SE2d 894; and Shanklin v.
Shanklin (1979, La.App.) 376 So.2d 1036.
Recent cases contain language requiring a
finding as to whether the welfare of the children
was affected [Hawkins v. Hawkins (1977) 240 Ga. 30,
359 SE2d 358; Schoonover v. Schoonover (1975, Iowa)
228 NW2d 31; In Re Marriage of Morton (1976, Iowa)
244 NW2d 819; Feldman v. Feldman (1974, 2d Dept.)
45 App.Div.2d 320, 358 NYS2d 507; and

Re Marriage of

01son 11981) 98 lll.App.3d 316, 53 Ill.Dec. 751,
424 NE2d 386];

whether the children have been in-

11

jured by their mother's cond11ct or by the relationship [Marchand v. Marchand 11971, La.App.I 246 So.2d
216, cert.den. 258 La. 769, 247 So.2d 865; Beebe v.
Beebe (1972, Colo.App.) 503 P2d 634; and Rupp v.
~

(1979, Pa.Super.) 408 A2d 883); whether there

was a showing of resulting detriment to the children
[In Re Marriage of Farris 11979) 69 Ill.App.3d 1042,
26 Ill.Dec. 608, 388 NE2d 232; Marriage of
Neidert (19771 28 Or.App. 309, 559 P2d 515; Soldner
v.Soldner (1979) 69!11.App.3d 97,25 Ill.Dec. 489,
386 NE2d 1153; Willcutts v. Willcutts (1980) 88 Ill.
App.3d 813, 43 Ill.Dec. 924, 410 NE2d 1057; Cleeton
v. Cleeton (1979, La.) 383 So.2d 1231; and Manley
v. Manley (1980, La.) 389 So.2d 454]; and whether
there was any

effect on the care and treatment of

the children [Steiner v. Steiner (1978) 257 Pa.
Super. 457, 390 A2d 1326; and Morrissey v. Morrissey,
(1962,Pa.J9Lebanon Co. Leg. J. 157].
This Court recently has considered the matter of custody where the custodial parent's heterosexual relations without marriage were continuing, or
apparently continuing, at the date of a custody determination.

Martinez v. Martinez, Utah, 652 P.2d 934

(19821 and ShioJi v. Shioji, Utah, 671 P.2d 135
( 1983).
In Martinez, Justice Howe affirmed the

12

'r· 1 al

court's change of custody from the mother to

,. ; '" tar_ her, where trial evidence established that
the child had been adversely affected by highly
detrimental circumstances in the mother's home.
The mother had stated to one witness that her liveln boyfriend had a drug problem and that he was
"lousing up" the child's life.

Several other wit-

nesses observed that the child was nervous, unsure
of herself, unhappy and cried frequently.

Frequent

quarrels between the mother and her boyfriend caused
the mother to move with the child to the home of
the mother's sister.

The welfare of the child had

been affected, the child had been injured by the
relationship, there was a showing of resulting detriment to the child and the evidence suggested that
there may have been an effect on the care and treatment of the child.

This Court found no abuse of

discretion warranting reversal.
In Shioji, supra, the Court vacated the
trial court's order changing custody of two daughters from their mother to their father on the sole
ground of the overnight presence in the mother's
home of her boyfriend.

Justice Durham, concurring

Mnd dissenting, noted that there was no trial evidence whatsoever of any detrimental effect on the
the appellant's parenting skills or on the children

13

themselves as a result uf

lh~

uccasinnal overnight

visits.
.Justice Durham wrote in Shioji:
"The 'best interests of the child'
standard is one which requires a thorough
and careful exploration of many factors,
including long-term relationships with a
primary caretaker, stability in placement,
parenting skills and styles, employment and
child-care schedules, as well as the presence in the- home of other persons (friends,
step-parents or other relatives).
I believe the trial court erred in basing its
order changing custody on the sole factor
of an inappropriate overnight visitation
practice. While we do not condone such a
practice, we have frequently noted such
'illicit' relationships must be shown to
have a detrimental effect on the interests
of the children before they can be the
predicate for a deprivation of custody.
See, e.g., Kallas v. Kallas, Utah, 614
P.2d 641 (19801.
Ifie language in Chief
Justice Hall's dissent in Nielsen v. Nielsen,
Utah, 620 P.2d 511 (1980), is entirely applicable to this case:
Although the record contains
no formal findings of fact and conclusions of law, the evidence presented appears to support the trial
judge's apparent conclusion that defendant's lifestyle, both economic
and moral, is somewhat inferior to
that of the plaintiff.
However,
the record is devoid of any evidence
whatsoever to the effect, if any, of
defendant's lifestyle upon the best
interests of Jimmy. Thus, it becomes
further apparent that the trial judge
simply drew a broad inference, without
any evidence in support thereof, that
the defendant's lifestyle did, in fact,
adversely affect the best interests
of her son.
In light of the highly equitable
nature of custody proceedings, I deem
it an injustice to base an order changing custody on such a broad inference

14

sr:anding alone.
ld at 513 (Hall, C.J., dissenting).
lustire Hall continued:

Chief

In regard to the immoral conduct
of the defendant, such behavior is
not to be considered in a vacuum.
Again, the focus must be upon the best
interests of the child, and in the absence of a showing of an adverse effect
upon those interests, a basis for a
change of custody is not made out.
As this Court stated the matter in
Stuber v. Stuber, (121 Utah 632, 244

P.Zd 650 (1952)]:

The fact that she lived with a
man whom she expected to marry, although censurable, does not in and
of itself make her an unfit and improper person to have the custody of
her child.
Id. at 514 (Hall, C.J., dissenting).
See also
Robinson v. Robinson, 15 Utah 2d 193, 391 P.2d

434 ( 1964).

Section 30-3-10 requires the trial court to
consider the best interests of the child, as well as
the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of
the parties.

Recent Utah case law has enumerated fac-

tors determinative of the best interests of the child
and factors which contribute to an assessment of the
past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of the
parties.

The burden falls on the trial court to as-

sess and weigh both sets of factors brought into play
bv the evidence in the light of its observations of

the parties and their witnesses.

The law requires

onlv that the evidence preponderate in favor of one
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party in a custody determination.

Only where

the trial court action is so flagrantly unjust
as to constitute an abuse of discretion should
the appellate forum interpose its own discretion.
Such is not the case here.
The Case at Bar
It cannot be said that the trial court
abused its discretion in awarding permanent custody
of the parties' two-year-old daughter to Respondent.

The trial court was presented with favorable

and unfavorable evidence regarding both Appellant
and Respondent on the issues of the best interests
of Kacie and on the issue of the past conduct and
demonstrated moral standards of the parties.
With regard to the factors determinative
of the best interests of the little girl, both parties
testified to the close relationship that existed between Kacie and Chris.

The trial court expressed its

concern for the "very important relationship between
the little girl and her brother--which I think is very
important and shouldn't be--the two shouldn't be separated, except for very compelling reasons."
In her report, the evaluator observed that
"(w)ith Kacie, Richard appeared very comfortable with
physical contact and Kacie climbed into his lap and
fell asleep during the interview."
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In her recommenda-

•

1

,,. ,

h"'"""""'r, the evaluator apparently felt the

,1_.~1.i'-t'1

of Kacie's bond with Respondent was the
Jhe evaluator wrote:

'>•'.rongec

"Melody Leetham does have a
ctnse, affectionate relationship with her
children and it is recommended that she be
awarded permanent custody of Kacie Leetham."
With regard to previously determined custody arrangements, Kacie had been with her mother,
the Respondent, all of her life, except for the few
days Appellant had taken six-week-old Kacie away
from her mother.

Respondent had had temporary custody

of Kacie for almost one year at the time of the divorce trial, and had devoted herself almost exclusively to her children for six months when unemployed.
With respect to the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of the parties, the evidence
was somewhat less conclusive.

Respondent had demon-

strated the depth of her desire to have Kacie with
her when she reconciled with Appellant rather than
be separated trom her six-week-old baby daughter.
Respondent had taken a voluntary lay off from her
jub in parr to spend more time with her children.
RPsponrient had cared for her Kacie and Chris for all
thf~jr

lives

Respondent was able to provide Kacie with
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a great amount of personal rather than surrogate
care,

Appellant, on the other hand, was very busy

with his job, his union presidency and his classes
at Trade Tech.

His mother would probably have

been taking care of Kacie when she would not have
been working

Other surrogate care arrangements

would have to have been made when Appellant's mother
would have been at work.
Financially, both parties appeared capable
of providing for Kacie.

Although unemployed at the

time of trial, Respondent expected to be recalled
to work at any time.

When working, Respondent earned

slightly more per hour than Appellant.
The evidence regarding Appellant's psychiatric history, his use of drugs in the past, the evaluator's observations that it seemed to be an effort for
Appellant to keep his voice and emotions under control,
and discrepancies regarding the financial declaration
Appellant submitted to the trial court might have raised
questions in the trial court's mind as to any impairment
of Appellant's ability to function as a parent.

Cer-

tainly, that evidence had a bearing on the trial court's
assessment of Appellant's moral character and emotional
stability.
The evidence regarding Respondent's relationship with Rex Stromberg was called to the trial court's
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'"n throughout the trial.

No evidence was

preseuted, however, as to any adverse effect of the
reJationshi.p on Kacie or on Respondent's ability to
function as a parent.

Respondent's admission that

she took Kacie into a bar on one occasion to return
some milk bottles rather than leave her alone in the
car was considered as well in its assessment of
Respondent's moral character and any impairment of
Respondent's ability to function as a parent.

No

evidence was presented reflecting adversely on Respondent's emotional stability.
The evidence clearly preponderates in favor
of Respondent.

Whether the trial court considered

the judicial preference for the mother in regard to
the custody of two-year-old Kacie is not apparent
from the record.

It cannot be said, in any event,

rhat the trial court abused its discretion in awarding permanent custody of Kacie Lynn Leetham to her
mother, Melody Leetham.
Appellant cites Utah cases where this Court
has affirmed the trial court's award of custody to
the father after weighing all evidence, including
the mother's moral transgressions.

Appellant can

cite no Utah case, however, where this Court has

found an abuse of discretion on the part of a trial
court and has reversed the trial court's award of
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custody.
The trial cou1L here struggled with the
custody decision ;ind admitted, "Well, this is not
an easy case on custody, I think."

The trial court

considered the factors bearing on the issue of the
best interests of the child, Kacie Lynn Leetham,
and the factors bearing on the issue of the past
conduct and demonstrated moral standards of the
parties.

The trial court recognized its duty to

assess the evidence and weigh the various factors.
The trial court stated, "The question is:

Which is

really the most important and how do you weigh that.
I'm not so sure I know the answer to it."
Based upon the evidence before it and
with due consideration for the difficulty of the task
ao hand, the trial court nevertheless reached its
decision.

The trial court awarded permanent custody

of Kacie Lynn Leetham to Respondent.

The trial

court recognized the necessity to admonish Respondent
regarding her conduct.

Tacitly, the trial court

appeared to recognize that to deprive Respondent of
custody would punish the child by denying her a
mother's care and that would not serve the best interests of the child.

This Court should affirm the

trial court's award of permanent custody to Respondent.
CONCLUSION

Section 30-3-10 U.C.A. 1953, as amended 1977,
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requires the trial court in a custody determination
ru consider the best interests of the children, as
wet.I. as the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of the parties.

The trial court here considered

the evidence relating to the factors determinative
of the best interests of Kacie Lynn Leetham and the
evidence bearing on the issue of the past conduct and
demonstrated moral standards of the parties, including
Appellant's psychiatric and drug abuse history and
Respondent's meretricious relationship with another
man.

The trial court may have indulged a judicial

preference for the mother in the matter of the custody
of a child of tender years.
This Court has demonstrated its deference to
the trial court unique opportunity to assess and weigh
the evidence in a child custody matter in the light of
the trial court's observations of the parties and their
witnesses.

This Court has not reversed a trial court's

determination of custody on a finding of an abuse of
discretion, even in difficult cases.
The modern trend in the case law of other
states and the case law of Utah requires a finding
as to whether the welfare of the children has been
adversely affected, whether the children have been
inJured by their mother's conduct or by the relationship, whether there has been a showing of resulting
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detriment to the children ot whether there has been
any adverse effect on the care and treatment of the
children.

No evidence was presented to the trial

court which would support any such finding in the
instant case.
This Court must affirm the determination
made by the trial court after due deliberation and
consideration of all the evidence that Respondent
be awarded the permanent care, custody and control
of the parties' minor

daug~,
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DATED this

Kacie Lynn Leetham.

day of January, 1984.
Submitted,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Mailed a true and correct copy of this
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STEVEN L. HANSEN
4872 Poplar Street
Murray, Utah 84107
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Attorney for Appellant
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